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ABSTRACT
Three decades after the Cambodian civil war, the leaders of the Khmer
Rouge will finally be brought before an internationalized domestic tribunal.
While the majority of those most responsible have died off or received immunity
for their conduct, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal has the historic possibility of
reaffirming the importance of international criminal justice and providing an
historical narrative of the crimes committed and victims created.
This commentary evaluates the importance of restoration in transitional
justice and the importance victims and witnesses play in post-conflict justice.
This article will argue that previous post-conflict remedies required a balance of
restorative and retribution in order to effectuate transitional justice. In turn, the
incorporation and protection of witnesses and victims was vital to reconciliation.
This article summarizes the importance of victims and witnesses in the
context of Cambodia and describes mechanisms the Khmer Rouge Tribunal can
use to enhance their participation and protection. By expanding the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal’s restorative role, it can bring provide post-conflict justice rather then
appease international guilt.
INTRODUCTION
Between April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979, the Cambodian communist movement, the
Khmer People's Revolutionary Party, ruled over Cambodia.1

Consistent with its policy of

agrarian socialism, the Khmer Rouge deported peoples in massive numbers from urban areas into
the countryside and was responsible for the deaths of over 1.5 million people, under the direction
of Pol Pot, before the Khmer Rouge’s military defeat by the Vietnamese.2
Thirty years after the Pol Pot regime systematically slaughtered almost one third of
Cambodia’s population, the majority of those responsible for the atrocities have yet to be tried.3
In 2004, following immense pressure by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)4, scholars, and

1

For an account on how the Khmer Rouge rose to power see BEN KIERNAN, HOW POL POT CAME TO
POWER: A HISTORY OF COMMUNISM IN KAMPUCHEA, 1930-1975 (1985).
2
It is also estimated that around 250,000 ethnic and religious minorities were expelled from Cambodia in
1975; id. at 107-09, 262-67.
3
Id.
4
See Press release, 21 February 2002, Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee available at
http://www.licadho.org/press/files/17FEBRUARY%2021%202002.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2006); Press release, 9
December 2002, Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee, available at
http://www.licadho.org/press/files/22DECEMBER%209%202002.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
1

the international community, the Royal Government of Cambodia agreed with the United
Nations to establish a tribunal to prosecute a select number of leaders responsible for the
atrocities during the Khmer Rouge period.5 The Extraordinary Chambers, or Khmer Rouge
Tribunal (KRT), was established as a hybrid court composed of both national and international
prosecutors and judges.6
While the creation of the KRT is yet another hallmark in the burgeoning history of
international criminal law, there are numerous and sincere questions about the KRT’s capacity to
ensure justice in post-conflict Cambodia. Where countries emerge from such destructive and
violent conflicts, such as in Cambodia, past crimes need to be reconciled in order to build for a
better future. Victims of human rights abuses possess an undeniable right of reparation.7 More
importantly, transitional justice necessitates the integration of victims and witnesses into the
peace-making process.
Although the Cambodian government, along with United Nations, agreed to create the
KRT to prosecute senior Khmer Rouge officials, serious concerns have been raised about the
reconciliatory role of the court. This paper does not deal with the rights of witnesses and victims
5

See generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea [hereinafter Cambodia-UN Agreement], available at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/draft%20agreement.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006)
6
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea of 2004, available at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Combination%20of%20KR%20Law%20and%20the%20Amended%205%20
Oct%202004%20-%20Eng.pdf [hereinafter EC Law] (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
7
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), at art. 8
(“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at art. 2(3)(a) (“To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, at art. 6 (“States Parties shall assure to everyone
within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies”); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), at art. 14 (“Each State Party
shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress”); Convention Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), Oct.18, 1907, at art.3 (“A belligerent party which violates the provisions
of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation”); Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter Rome Statute] at arts. 68, 75.
2

per se. Clearly, the role of victims and witnesses changes in post-conflict settings, and whether
the rights owed to victims and witnesses alters from normative settings is not a matter for this
paper. Rather, this paper deals less with rights than with theories of transitional justice and
whether the KRT, using its existing structures, can achieve transitional justice in Cambodia. To
that extent, the participation and protection of victims and witnesses in the KRT is necessary
because of the central importance they take in rehabilitation, reconciliation, and restoration.
The first part of this paper will outline the contours of transitional justice by evaluating
the importance of both restorative and retributive notions of justice.8 Because of the breadth and
depth of crimes committed during conflict setting, post-conflict societies require a balance
between mechanisms which punish criminal offenders and those which contribute to community
healing and reconciliation.9

The failure to provide one over the other creates significant

obstacles to transitioning societies in promoting peace and stability.

Thus, the first part

concludes that both retribution and restoration models need to be incorporated into judicial
systems when dealing with past crimes and abuses in post-conflict settings.10
The second part of this paper looks at the failures of the ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and
Yugoslavia in emphasizing restorative notions of justice.11

Because of those failures,

communities in Rwanda and former Yugoslav countries have been forced to look outside of
international criminal tribunals and have created separate institutions that emphasize
restoration.12 The second part concludes that the success, or failure, of restorative mechanisms
depends fundamentally on the participation and protection of victims and witnesses.13 Thus,

8

See infra, text accompanying notes 20-87.
See infra, text accompanying notes 20-31.
10
See infra, text accompanying notes 32-87.
11
See infra, text accompanying notes 88-110.
12
See infra, text accompanying notes 111-136.
13
See infra, text accompanying notes 135-136.
9

3

institutions that promote victim and witness participation in combating past atrocities contribute
greater to restorative objectives. In part, these lessons have resulted in significant roles for
victims within the International Criminal Court and newly formed hybrid tribunals.14
The last part of this paper will evaluate the role of the KRT in promoting victim and
witness protection and participation. The KRT will only prosecute a limited number of Khmer
Rouge leaders.15 Additionally, there are no alternative restorative mechanisms, as in Rwanda,
South Africa, or Sierra Leone.16 Because public expectations and feeling of injustice is high in
Cambodia, it is necessary that the KRT expand its restorative role.17 The third part will conclude
that there are ample provisions within the KRT’s law that judges and prosecutors can draw from
which would enhance the KRT’s reconciliatory role.18 Only by expanding this role can the KRT
contribute to community building in Cambodia.
I.

TYPES OF JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
Following a period of political rule characterized by violence, oppression, and poverty,

post conflict countries are often faced with serious economic, social, and political instability.19
To address the multi-faceted problems confronting post-conflict societies, a number of remedial
mechanisms, both domestically and internationally, have been utilized in the pursuit of justice.
While not exhaustive, a list of judicial, or quasi-judicial, mechanisms implemented to address

14

See infra, text accompanying notes 137-148.
See infra, text accompanying notes 152-162.
16
See infra, text accompanying notes 163-173.
17
See infra, text accompanying notes 174-177.
18
See infra, text accompanying notes 178-221.
19
As noted by Bassiouni, “since 1945 there have been some 250 conflicts in almost every region of the
world which have caused, at the low end, an estimated 70 million casualties, and at the high end, 170 million.” M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 576 (2003).
15

4

widespread international crimes include the creation of international tribunals;20 the
establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions;21 the exercise of jurisdiction by State
courts on the basis of territoriality,22 personality,23 or universality24; and the establishment of

20

U.N. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 827 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Former Yugoslavia); U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. (1994) (establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda)
21
A number of truth and reconciliation commissions have emerged in the past couple decades in postconflict societies in Argentina (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas); Chile (Comisión Nacional
de Verdad y Reconciliación); El Salvador (UComisión de la Verdad); Fiji (Reconciliation and Unity Commission);
Guatelama (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico); Peru (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación);Sirra
Leone (Truth and Reconciliation Commission); East Timor (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação
em Timor Leste); and the United States (Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission). See United States
Institute of Peace, Truth Commissions Digital Collection, available at http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html (last
visited Mar. 6, 2006)
22
Strassheim v. Daily, 1911, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (“Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had
been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power”)
23
See People of Israel v. Eichmann, Supreme Court of Israel, Judgment of 29 May 1962 in ILR, Vol. 36, p.
306.
24
Article 23 of the Spanish 1985 Law on Judicial Power provides that Spanish courts have jurisdiction over
crimes committed outside of Spain if they constitute crimes which Spain is obligated to prosecute under custom or
international treaties, Sentence of the Constitutional Tribunal of Spain in the Guatemala Genocide Case, Second
Chamber of the Constitutional Tribunal, Sep. 26, 2005, obtainable at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/guatemala/doc/tcgtm1.html; Decision of the Audiencia Nacional (Sala de lo penal)
of 13 December 2000 (genocide in Guatemala), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf (last visited Feb. 21,
2006).
Article 6 of the German Penal Code, which provides for universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes even when the crime has been committed abroad and has no link to Germany,
Code of Crimes Against International Law, sec. 153f, available at
http://www.bmj.bund.de/frames/eng/service/legislation_plans/10000582/index.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
Prior to legislative restrictions imposed by the Belgian legislature in 2003, the Law of 16 June 1993
permitted Belgian courts to have jurisdiction over grave breaches to the 1949 Geneve Conventions no matter where
the offences were committed or by whom. See Loi relative à la repression des violations graves de droit international
humanitaire, Art. 3 §§ A-B (1999), published in Moniteur Belge, Mar. 23, 1999. Belgium’s new law now requires
either the presence of the defendant or that the victim either be Belgian or have resided in Belgium for at least three
years when the alleged crimes took place. 5 August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law, Moniteur Belge, 7 Aug. 2003, pp. 40506 et. seq.
The French, under the French Code de Procédure Pénale, requires passive personality in order to exercise
extra-territorial jurisdiction. CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 689-1 [Penal Code] (1988) ("Any
foreigner who, outside the territory of the Republic, commits a felony, either as perpetrator, or as accomplice, may
be prosecuted and tried according to French law, when the victim of this felony is of French nationality.") translated
in THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Gerald L. Kock & Richard S. Frase trans., rev. ed.) (1988); see
also Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention (France), Committee
Against Torture, at 17-18, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/17/Add.18 (1997). Austria, however, requires extradition to be
impossible before exercising universal jurisdiction. See A. Marschik, European National Approaches to War
Crimes, in THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 79, 79-81 (T. L. H.
MCCORMACK & G. J. SIMPSON ed., 1997).
For more cases and discussion on the application of universal jurisdiction se also Gabriel Bottini, Universal
Jurisdiction After the Creation of the International Criminal Court, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 503 (2004);
Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383, 321-92 (2001);
5

hybrid, or internationalized courts.25 The responses to atrocities can be loosely categorized into
mechanisms of retributive and restorative justice.26
Given the widespread nature of international crimes and the significant sectarian divides
that characterize many post-conflict societies, both the notions of restoration and retribution are
critical components to transitional justice.27

Retributive justice emphasizes the need for

punishment and deterrence28 while restorative justice focuses on reconciliation, rehabilitation
and the rebuilding of society.29
However the two are not mutually exclusive, nor can be considered as competing
alternatives.30 As the next two sections indicate, both retributive mechanisms are necessary but
insufficient to individually result in transitional justice. In many cases, States are left with a
stark conflict between “peace” and “justice.” The creation of institutions that solely focus on one
or the other fall short in light of the benefits and problems each provide. Thus, the process of

Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.
J. 183 (2004); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785 (1988);
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 311 (2001).
25
See S.C. Res. 1315, P 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, Aug. 10, 2001, available at
http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20promulgated%20(Eng%20trans%206%20Sept%20200
1).pdf (English translation) (last visited Mar. 5, 2006); Agreement between the United Nations and the Government
of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone P 1, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002,
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-agreement.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2006); S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (creating the hybrid court in East Timor); Paul Bremer, III, Administrator, Coalition
Provisional Authority, Iraq, Order No. 48, Delegation of Authority Regarding Establishment of an Iraqi Special
Tribunal (Dec. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Appendix_A.pdf (last visited Mar. 5,
2006) (creating the internationalized Special Court in Iraq).
26
See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES 63-82 (1990).
27
See generally Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in
Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 661 (2004).
28
See David A. Crocker, Democracy and Punishment: Punishment, Reconciliation, and Democratic
Deliberation, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 509, 536 (2002) (“The deterrent effect of prosecution and punishment is
weakened when people believe they can break the law and get away with it.”)
29
See generally id (outlining the general theories and philosophies relating to retributive justice)
30
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 409
(2000) (stating “policies and practices of accommodation in the pursuit of political settlement conflict with legal
accountability in the pursuit of retributive and restorative justice”); see also RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
51-59 (2002); ANDREAS O'SHEA, AMNESTY FOR CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2002).
6

reconciliation requires retribution and retribution can not stand without reconciliation. Peaceful
and just transition in Cambodia necessitates that the ideals of retribution and restoration are
balanced in the prosecution of leaders before the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.31
a. Retributive Justice
The idea of retributive justice (or lex talionis) stems from the theoretical view that social
equality, or fairness, can only be achieved through punishment.32 The notion of “punishment”
incorporates certain historical practices implemented to address acts that constitute “crimes.”33
Subsequently, our notions of “retribution” and justice are derived from historical acts intended to
restore social equality.34 From a practical point of view, retribution is important in order to
prevent people from escaping punishment (impunity)35 and also to act as a deterrent for future
crimes.36

By determining individual responsibility and punishing individuals, retributive

mechanisms prevent guilt from being assigned to a collective group of people in society.37 Thus,
it can assist in the process of rebuilding society by preventing further social division and
alienation.

31
For a general understanding of principles of transitional justice, including a more specific explanation of
retributive and restorative forms of justice see Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A
Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002).
32
See Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, 49 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 355, 376 (1999).
33
See generally Frederick Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals II, in ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS
AND ECCE HOMO 8 (W. Kaufman ed., W. Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967).
34
See J. LLEWELLYN & R. HOWSE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 39 (1998).
35
See generally IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1989).
36
See BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 20, at 696-97 (“Rather, [retribution] can
produce utilitarian results and achieve humanistic goals, such as deterrence and rehabilitation”); Crocker, supra note
29, at 536.
37
See Lode Walgrave, Restoration in Youth Justice, 31CRIME & JUST. 543, 558 (2004) (“In retributive
justice, this [moral balance of rights and wrongs] is achieved by imposing suffering on the offender that is
commensurate to the social harm he caused by his crime”).

7

In part, retribution is instinctively attractive.38 Communities expect law-breakers to be
punished for their crimes. Similarly, the international community expects that perpetrators of
atrocities will face judgment and punishment. Conversely, there is a sense of injustice when
persons who perpetrate crimes are not punished.39 For example, it is thought that injustice
occurs when a person receives immunity after committing harm.40 This is not to say that
retribution and revenge are synonymous.41 Retribution is the unbiased act of punishing criminal
conduct, rather then the emotional act of inflicting pain for personalized attacks like insults or

38

See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 237-38 (1976) (“The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of
man”). In part, the instinctive attractiveness of retributive justice can be traced back to the integration of religious
law into communities. A number of passages, at least in popular Western religions, contain elements of retribution
for criminal conduct. For example, the Old Testament describes that God stated, “‘Whoever sheds the blood of
man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in His own image.’” Genesis 9:6; Similar elements are
continued in the New Testament and Islamic Law, both of which prescribe specific punishments for criminal
conduct. John 19:11 (King James) (Jesus’ recognition that God has given man the power to punish ); Sura alBaqarah, 2:178-179, Sura al-Ma’ida, 5:45, Sura al-Nisa, 4:92 (outlining Qu’ranic prescriptions for penalty and
victim rights.) See also TAHIR MAHMOOD ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW IN ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1996); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Qesas Crimes, in ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
203 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982). A number of scholars have also posited that from a biological perspective
retributive emotions are more basic and easy to understand whereas the concept of reconciliation or restoration is
much more rationalist. DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE 27-28 (1997).
39
See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (1797) (theorizing that the failure to punish is an
injustice to society and is the essence of the social contract.)
40
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is highly regarded as a “restorative
mechanism” similarly does not completely disregard the need for retribution. In justifying the license of impunity,
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, whom chairs the TRC, argues that the granting of amnesty does not forego retributive
justice. Rather, the perpetrators punishment is that he must “admit responsibility for the act for which amnesty is
being sought” and that the perpetrator must face the “full glare of publicity.” Desmond Tutu, ‘Chairperson's
Foreward’ in Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, presented to President Nelson Mandela on Oct.
29, 1998 at vol. 1, 8.
41
This argument has been thoroughly rejected by retributive theorists. See generally ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 366 (1981) (“retribution is done for a wrong, while revenge may be done for an
injury or slight and need not be done for a wrong.”) Crocker, supra note 29, at 517 (“Retribution provides both a
sword to punish wrongdoers and a shield to protect them from more punishment than they deserve. In contrast to
punishment, revenge is wild, ‘insatiable,’ and unlimited. After killing his victims, an agent of revenge may mutilate
them and incinerate their houses.”); Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism in
Recovering States, 49 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 389, 419-20 (1999) (noting the five primary differences between
retribution and revenge).
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taunts.42 Unlike revenge, retribution seeks to not simply punish, but punish justly with punitive
limitations.43 Retribution is about “just deserts” and not simply “deserts.”
Traditional national criminal trials, at least in North America and Europe, tend to
emphasize the retributive aspect of justice. Criminal trials are mechanisms for punishing the
perpetrator for committing a wrong rather then for restoring peace between communities.44
Similarly, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, following the Second World War, were constructed
for the explicit purpose of punishing criminal offenders rather then creating reconciliation
between the warring powers or their communities.45
Given the complex and widespread violence that characterize States in conflict, there are
numerous shortcomings that accompany the sole use of retributive mechanisms. First, if the
punishment is to be equal to the crime, then no punishment can ever address the gravity of
widespread, mass atrocities like genocide, terrorism, or crimes against humanity.46 For example,
would exercising the death penalty on Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic
really be proportional to their participation in the killing of millions of people? If justice is based
on the equity of the punishment, then no punishment can be equitable to the severity of the

42
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 230-31 (M. Oakeshott ed., 1975) (“From the definition of punishment, I
infer, first, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be styled punishment; because
they proceed not from public authority”).
43
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 194-204 (W. Hastie trans., 1974) (1887) (punishment is not
arbitrary but equitable to the nature of the crime); NOZICK, supra note 42, at 366.
44
See DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 54 (1999) (“the ‘chief goal’ of ‘retributive
justice’ is ‘to be punitive’”).
45
See id. at 19; DAVID LUBAN, THE LEGACIES OF NUREMBERG IN LEGAL MODERNISM 335-37 (1994);
ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 15-18 (1998).
46
See Aukerman, supra note 32, at 39 (“true retributive justice is almost always unachievable in the wake
of radical evil…it is often impossible even in prosecutions to impose a punishment that is proportional to the
crime”); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND
MASS VIOLENCE 121 (1998) (“[massive human rights atrocities] call for more severe responses than would any
ordinary criminal conduct, even the murder of an individual . . .And yet, there is no punishment that could express
the proper scale of outrage”).
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crimes committed by these persons. Subsequently, justice can never be served when viewed
from a purely retributive position.47
Second, the sheer numbers of those persons who generally participate in widespread
atrocities means that only the top leaders or only the low-level officers, but not all persons
responsible, can be prosecuted and punished.48

Transitional societies lack the institutional

capacity to punish all responsible persons.49 Post-conflict societies often suffer from insufficient
judicial resources to confront both ordinary crimes, which rise during transitional periods,50 as
well as the number of acts committing during the conflict.51 Therefore, a society that only values
retribution for transition, can never effectively achieve justice in post-conflict states.52
Lastly, retributive mechanisms can potentially create greater rifts between communities.
If only members of one ethnic, religious, or national group are prosecuted for committing
offenses, the perpetrator will be perceived as the victim and thus justify further actions against
the other community. For example, prosecution of all Hutus responsible for the Rwandan
47

DONALD SHRIVER, AN ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS 82 (1995) (“Justice falls limp
before monster-sized evil”).
48
See Prosecutor v. Delalic et al, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision, Feb. 20, 2001, ¶ 602 (Appeals Chamber,
ICTY) (“In the present context, indeed in many criminal justice systems, the entity responsible for prosecutions has
finite financial and human resources and cannot realistically be expected to prosecute every offender which may fall
within the strict terms of its jurisdiction. It must of necessity make decisions as to the nature of the crimes and the
offenders to be prosecuted.”); Aukerman, supra note 32, at 61-62 (“Such selective, limited prosecutions--the only
kind possible in transitional justice--fail to meet the basic requirements of retributive justice.”) Aukerman also notes
“Selective prosecution further undermines retributive goals because prosecutors rarely succeed in targeting only the
most culpable.”
49
See Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, Report of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graca
Machel, U.N. Doc. A/51/306, P116 (1996) (“Following the conflict in Rwanda, for example, only 20 percent of the
judiciary survived, and the courts lacked the most basic resources”); Laura A. Dickinson, Transitional Justice in
Afghanistan: The Promise of Mixed Tribunals, 31 Denv. J. INT'L L. & POL’Y 23, 36-37 (2002) (“In post-conflict
situations, the need to develop local capacity in the justice sector is often an urgent problem. Kosovo and East Timor
provide extreme examples. In both cases, the conflict virtually eliminated the physical infrastructure of the judiciary;
court buildings, prisons, and equipment [*37] were destroyed”).
50
See Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrations Should Not Always Be Punished: Where the International
Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 214 (2000) (“The escalation of crime in countries
moving away from repressive rule indeed tends to undermine the democratic attempts to resolve past conflicts to
which some within opposing political camps may be ready to recommit themselves”).
51
Id.
52
See Aukerman, supra note 32, at 61; Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights
Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2620 (1991).
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genocide could do more to strengthen differences between the two ethnic groups, rather then
reconcile them.53 Similarly, many Germans viewed the Nuremburg trials as “victors’ justice” for
failure to prosecute British officials responsible for atrocities in Germany.54

Thus, greater

prosecution in post-conflict societies can do more to inhibit peaceful transition than to further it.
b. Restorative Justice
Restorative justice is equally important because it emphasizes the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of a divided society and it involves perpetrators meeting their victims.55
Restorative theorists view the criminal justice system as a community-building process.56 Rather
then viewing criminal justice as a conflict between the state and the perpetrator, restorativists
view criminal justice as a conflict between the perpetrator, victim and the community.57
Subsequently, retributive justice emphasizes community building, rehabilitation, restitution, and
reintegration rather then punishment.58
53

See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,
466 (1999) (“At present, criminal processes in Arusha and within Rwanda are likely to generate radically different
reactions along ethnic lines. For many Hutus, both international and national criminal processes appear skewed
against them since the ICTR's temporal limits mean that its indictments and trials will focus on offenses committed
by Hutus and ignore most violence committed by Tutsis, while Rwanda’s present courts are more likely to be unfair
to Hutu defendants and less likely to pursue charges against Tutsi offenders”).
54
LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 19 (1992)
55
See generally RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds.,
1996); Daniel Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislation for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U.L. REV. 53, 66 (1998)
(detailing principles of restorative justice); John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized:
Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743-44 (1999) (“Restorative justice is a process of bringing
together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm
caused by the crime”).
56
See Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81
B.U.L. REV. 289, 292-94 (2001)
57
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 2 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996)
58
See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 375 (2005)
(“Restorative justice is a reform movement that emphasizes restitution and rehabilitation over punishment and
mandates that all those affected by the crime”); John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized:
Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) (“Restorative justice is a process of bringing together
the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by
the crime.”); Ellen A. Waldman, Healing Hearts or Righting Wrongs?: A Meditation on the Goals of “Restorative
Justice”, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 355, 359 (2004) (“Rather, restorativists are primarily concerned with
meeting victim needs, which they understand to include redress and repair, rather than revenge and retaliation.”)
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The argument for restorative justice is greater emphasized in post-conflict societies.
Civil conflicts are usually the result of internal domestic ethnic, religious, or national divisions,
which erupt into military confrontations, massacres, or even genocide.

They can involve

thousands to millions of victims and perpetrators. Restorative justice therefore aims to consider
the impact justice can have on the future of a society and its social classes.59
In order to create convergences in divided societies, retributive mechanisms generally
give prominent roles to victims and the community in addition to the defendant.60

These

mechanisms include mediations, conferencing groups, truth and reconciliation commissions,61
and other programs that integrate victims and perpetrators.62

The most notable restorative

mechanism is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).63 The South
African TRC was created to determine what happened during South Africa’s apartheid period,
rather then punish guilty individuals.64 Thus, the TRC provided victims, witnesses, and the

59

TUTU, supra note 45, at 54-55.
In its 1998 report, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that restorative justice
“seeks to redefine crime: it shifts the primary focus of crime from the breaking of laws or offences against a faceless
state to a perception of crime as violations against human beings ... [and] encourages victims, offenders and the
community to be directly involved in resolving conflicts.” 1 South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ch. 5, 82 at 126 (1998)
61
See generally PRISCILLA HAYNOR, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: THE PLACE FOR TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN A
CHANGING WORLD (2000).
62
See MARK S. UMBREIT, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND
MEDIATION 2 (1994)
63
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995, available at
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm [hereinafter Amnesty Act] (last visited Mar. 2, 2006); See also
RICHARD WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POSTAPARTHEID STATE (2001); JILLIAN EDELSTEIN, TRUTH & LIES: STORIES FROM THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA (2002); KADER ASMAL ET AL., RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING
OF APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE (1996). Shortly after the TRC was established, the constitutionality of the
amnesty provisions were challeneged in the Constitution Court and were unanimously upheld. Azanian People's
Organisation (AZAPO) & Others v. The President of the Republic of South Africa & Others, 17 CC 96 (S. Afr).
64
Archbishop Desmond Tutu noted that the South African TRC was based on the theory of retributive
justice which has historical roots in African culture: “Retributive justice - in which an impersonal state hands down
punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator - is not the only form of justice. I
contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was characteristic of traditional African
jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of
breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to
rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the
community he or she has injured.” TUTU, supra note 45, at 54-55.
60
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perpetrator the opportunity to tell their stories in return for amnesty and immunity from criminal
prosecution.65 In part, the TRC was a political compromise.66 Rather than risking a further
racial divide in South Africa, the TRC promoted participation by perpetrators. On the other
hand, to prevent perpetrators from receiving complete impunity for their acts, the TRC required
that the crimes were politically motivated and the person seeking amnesty told the entire and
whole truth.67
In transitional societies, employing restorative mechanisms, as evidenced in South
Africa, is crucial because there are a large number of victims and perpetrators.68 In the context
of prolonged widespread conflict, it is impossible for all victims and witnesses to be heard and
for all offenders to be prosecuted in war and genocide tribunals.69 It is then very likely that
victims and their perpetrators will be living in close proximity and must learn to live with deepseated animosity and the painful memories of the past. Thus, restorative mechanisms shift the
perspective of justice by encouraging truth telling instead of punishment, vengeance, or
revenge.70
In a number of cases, restorative mechanisms have been utilized to encourage despotic
leaders to transfer authority to emerging democratic efforts by granting amnesty from

65

See Amnesty Act, supra note 63, at art. 20 (listing the conditions for amnesty).
See Alex Boraine, Truth And Reconciliation in South Africa, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF
TRUTH COMMISSIONS, 141, 143 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000) (the outcome in South Africa
was “a negotiated settlement, a political compromise,” and it was “the only one possible in the conditions of
transition in 1994.”); Suzanne Daley, Official Urges New Amnesty to Erase Scar of Apartheid, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 26,
1999, at A10.
67
See Amnesty Act, supra note 63, at art. 20 (listing the conditions for amnesty).
68
See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 51, at 209 (“Nation-building clearly requires the voice of victims and
survivors to be heard”).
69
See infra, text accompanying notes 89-93.
70
See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 51, at 215 (“Retributive justice affirms the place of lex talionis (“an eye
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”) as an alternative to unbridled revenge”); TUTU, supra note 45, at 58 (“the
solution arrived at was not perfect but it was the best that could be had in the circumstances - the truth in exchange
for the freedom of the perpetrators”).
66
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prosecution.71

Subsequently, immunity from prosecution is granted in order to avoid the

continuation of “massive bloodshed” by bargaining for the removal of dictatorships.72

In

Argentina, President Saul Menem pardoned all officers and leaders responsible for human rights
abuses committed by the preceding military juntas in fear of a military coup.73 The Chilean
government, under Augusto Pinochet, passed self-amnesty laws before giving power to the
civilian government.74

Military dictator Idi Amin also conceded power only by receiving

amnesty from Uganda.75 Lastly, Haitian General Raoul Cedras was given amnesty in exchange
for passing over political and military authority to Haiti’s new democratic government.76
Moreover, amnesty and immunity are granted in order to address emerging geopolitical
realities. For example, the Allies granted impunity to Turkish officials from being prosecuted for
the killing of Armenians during World War I, in order to create an alliance against the Soviet
Union.77 Similarly, Saddam Hussein was offered amnesty by the United States, prior to the start
of the 2003 Iraqi war, in exchange for abdication of power, partially in order to avoid the
destruction of thousands of lives and homes.78

71

In order to negotiate peaceful transition and prevent the possibility of a coup, newly formed governments
in Uganda, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile agreed to grant amnesties to predecessor governments, including grave
violations of human rights.
72
President Bill Clinton, Remarks at White House Press Conference (Sept. 19, 1994), in The Crisis in
Haiti, U.S. Department of State, Sept. 19, 1994 (justifying the amnesty deal with the Haitian government on the
basis that it avoid “massive bloodshed and perhaps an extended period of occupation that could have been troubling
to our country and to the world.”)
73
See generally CARLOS S. NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996)
74
On Aug. 8, 2000, Chile’s highest court stripped Pinochet of his immunity and ordered him to stand trial
for murder. See Clifford Krauss, Chile’s Effort to Try Pinochet Is Running Out of Steam, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2001, at A3.
75
See Bernard Levin, Darkness and Devils, THE TIMES, Sept. 8, 1995.
76
See generally Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace? Was There a Duty to Prosecute
International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (1996)
77
Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 31, at 414; see Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at
Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11.
78
See Remarks of President in Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003 (on file with author); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Post-war Justice, Justifying War, CHI. TRIB, Mar. 17, 2003, at p. 1.
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From a theoretical standpoint, restorative mechanisms run contrary to obligations every
nation has to prosecute or extradite (aut dedere, aut judicare) perpetrators of grave human rights
violations.79 There is a general rule in international law prohibiting specific crimes which have
acquired the nature of peremptory norms (jus cogens) from receiving impunity.80 Jus cogens
crimes create legal interests within all states (obligations erga omnes)81 and prevents states from
using legislative fiat or political compromises to avoid fulfillment of such obligations.82 The
realizations of obligations are weakened every time a state utilizes immunities and amnesties to
shield perpetrators from accountability.83 While amnesties can deliver the short-term benefit of

79

See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE
OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2599 (1991) (“The duty to
punish human rights crimes imposed by customary law can readily accommodate the constraints faced by
transitional societies.”); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human
Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (1990) (“Therefore, both policy and legal arguments
support the conclusion that while a state may permissibly pass amnesties for some offenses in response to a
perceived emergency, no amnesty may preclude investigation and prosecution of those responsible for offenses that
violate non-derogable rights -- including freedom from torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial
executions”).
80
See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14) (there are no exceptions to
immunity from criminal inviolability when the alleged crime are crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Decision, Dec. 10, 1998, ¶ 155 (Appeals Chamber, ICTY) (holding that states can
not use the legislative process to absolve perpetrators of torture through an amnesty law because torture is a
peremptory norm of international law.); Union Progresista de Fiscales de Espana et al. v. Pinochet, Audiencia
Nacional, Nov. 5, 1998 (Spain), at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/audi.html (amnesty laws can not be
enforced against jus cogens crime); General Comment No. 20 on Article 7, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 44th
Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994) (“The Committee has noted that some States have granted amnesty in
respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to
guarantee freedom from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future. States
may not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation
as may be possible”).
81
See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J.
126 (Feb. 3) at ¶ 60 (jus cogens obligations create obligations erga omnes.); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) at ¶ 42 (holding that obligations erga omnes are binding on all States
and opposable against any State).
82
Nuremburg International Military Tribunal: Judgment and Sentence, 41 A.J.I.L. 172, 221 (1947)
(“individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the
individual State”).
83
See Scharf, International Crimes in Haiti, supra note 77, at 12 (“impunity breeds contempt for the law
and encourages future violations.”). As Scharf also notes the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities as well as fact-finding missions to
Chile and El Salvador “impunity is one of the main reasons for the continuation of grave violations of human rights
throughout the world…[and] led to an increase in abuses in those countries.” See id; United Nations Commission on
Human Rights: Report on the Consequences of Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1990/13; United Nations, General
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democracy and peace, they create the long-term problem of encouraging dictators by removing
the deterrent effect of retribution.84 The failure to prosecute also prevents victims and witnesses
from reconciling their feelings with the past by perpetuating a sense of injustice.85 Victims may
feel that even the emerging political institution has cheated them out of justice and thus continue
to harbor emotions and feelings antithetical to the goals of transition.86 Thus, the feeling of
discontent may eventually re-create the type of discord and anger which fueled the initial
conflict.87
II.

PAST TRIBUNAL EXPERIENCES
In confronting the problems for transitional justice left by prolonged conflict or,

widespread violence, the experience of the two ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia
illustrate the need to balance retributive and restorative considerations. The 1994 Rwandan
genocide left approximately one million people dead.88 It is estimated that tens of thousands of

Assembly, Report of the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. A/38/385 at 146 (1983). Following the amnesty
agreement with Turkish officials, Adolf Hitler was recorded for justifying the invasion of Poland partly on the idea
that human tradegies in the past have often been neglected by emphatically stating “Who now remembers the
Armenians?.” See Bassiouni, Combating Impunity, supra note 31 at 414.
84
Scharf, International Crimes in Haiti, supra note 77, at 39 (“Instead…Haitian amnesty is likely to serve
as a beacon of hope for those accused of some of history's most shocking atrocities in Bosnia, Iraq, and Cambodia.
In other parts of the globe, future dictators will be encouraged by the Haitian amnesty to commit new atrocities with
impunity.”)
85
In the cases cited above, the passage of amnesty laws were met with massive popular protests calling for
the overture of such laws. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 79, at 458-62.
86
The International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia’s failure to prosecute a number of key figures to the
Yugoslav civil war, including President Slobodan Milosevic, has led much of the affected population in a sense of
injustice. See Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millennium:
Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 977 (2000); see also Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues
of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 380 (2003).
87
See Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 43, 47-49, 56
(Joseph Sandars & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2000) (providing studies which conclude that non-punishment of an
offender is likely to promote aggression toward others.)
88
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Segui, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of Commission Resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of
25 May 1994, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12, P 24, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/7 (1994).
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people participated in the genocide.89 The conflict in the former Yugoslavia left almost 200,000
Muslims dead90 and created approximately 2 million refugees.91

It is also estimated that

hundreds of thousands of civilians and soldiers were responsible for Milosevic’s campaign of
ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia.92
Following the conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations (UN),
under the Security Council’s Article VII powers to “maintain or restore international peace and
security”,93 created two international tribunals to prosecute persons most responsible in the
Rwandan and Yugoslav conflicts.94 In establishing two special tribunals, the Security Council
was “convinced that … the prosecution of persons responsible for such acts and violations …
would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance
of peace.”95 The two ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, were ostensibly modeled after the
Nuremburg and Tokyo military courts created following World War II.96
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The number of people who participated in Rwanda’s genocide is debatable. Some studies have even held
that approximately 200,000 people were directly or indirectly involved in the genocide in some way. See Scott
Straus, How many perpetrators were there in the Rwandan genocide? An estimate, 6 J. OF GENOCIDE RESEARCH 85
(2004).
90
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, The fall of Srebrenica,
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, G.A. 54th Session, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/54/549, (1999).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, at art. 39.
94
See U.N. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res. 827 (1993) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal
for Former Yugoslavia); U.N. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg. (1994) (establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda)
95
UN document S/RES/955 of 8 November 1994; see also Report of the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994) where
ICTY President, Antonio Cassese specifically stated that “the Yugoslav Tribunal is a tool for promoting
reconciliation.”
96
See RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 31-39 (2001).
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Both ad hoc tribunals were designed to only meet the retributive needs of prosecution and
punishment, rather then restoration and retribution.97 Reconciliation, was more of a secondary
purpose intended to be an indirect result of the tribunal.98 The ICTR and ICTY only aimed to
provide reconciliation by giving victims a sense of justice that the main perpetrators of the
crimes would be punished.99
Since the ICTY and ICTR functioned under the belief that prosecution was a foundation
for reconciliation, witnesses and victims did not play a major role in trial proceedings.100 While
both ad hoc tribunals provide extensive laws on the protection of witnesses and victims,101
neither the ICTY and ICTR provided the right of victims to be represented and heard during
criminal proceedings.102 That exclusion has since fueled severe criticism by the international
community as to the effectiveness of both institutions in providing for post-conflict
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ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 376-87 (2003) (stating that the ad hoc tribunals
mirrored the Nuremburg and Tokyo proceedings which sought to punish offenders rather then reconcile
communities).
98
See id. at 6. Jaya Ramji similarly notes, international trials are intended to deter future crimes and
provide retribution for victims. However, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation are ancillary effects
which may indirectly result. Alternatively, many scholars also argue that there is a duty to prosecute human rights
offenders, regardless of how it effects political and social transition. Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming Cambodian History:
The Case for a Truth Commission, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 137 (2000). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in
POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 3, 26 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002); Orentlicher, supra note 79, at 2548.
99
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Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 12, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994).
100
See Press Release, Security Council Meets To Discuss International Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda (Nov. 21, 2000), U.N. Doc. SC/6956, available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001121.sc6956.doc.html (last accessed Mar. 23, 2006).
101
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 22, annexed to Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. GAOR, May 19, 1993,
U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1193-97 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 21, adopted at New York, Nov. 8, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598; BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 20, at 649-52 (detailing the rules and procedures in the ICTY and ICTR relating to victim and witness
protection).
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See Press Release, supra note 100; RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 14 (2002).
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reconciliation.103

Most affected populations feel disconnected from international tribunal

proceedings and judgments, as the courts do not publish individualized accounts of victims’
suffering.104 The ad hoc tribunals instead focus only on facts relevant to the charges against the
respective defendants, leaving victims and witnesses feeling neglected and undermined.105
Subsequently, one commentator was left to note that “international and foreign tribunals are far
less likely to promote reconciliation insofar as the trials are not of and do not speak directly to
the troubled society.”106
a. Alternatives to the ad hoc tribunals
For a country to transform into a state of increased prosperity and stability, the past
conflicts must be reconciled between the two sides. Without reconciliation, deeply divided
sectors of society will not shed their tensions. Therefore, restorative mechanisms are one way
that victims can find a sense of justice. Without specific mechanisms that listen to individual
grievances of victims, victims can feel left out of the peace process and further alienated.
The ICTY and ICTR failed to incorporate provisions that would enable victims to appear
before the ad hoc tribunals or to claim compensation. The prevalence of the adversarial model
on international legal institutions107 has not boded well for the involvement of witnesses and
victims. As a result, various “alternative” adjudicatory models have recently emerged to address
103

See Neil Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in POST
CONFLICT JUSTICE 59 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
104
See The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of California,
Berkeley, & the Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability, and Social
Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 102, 144-47
(2000).
105
See Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, “The Role of Justice in Building Peace”: The Functions of
Justice and Anti-Justice in the Peace-Building Process, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 161, 175 (2003).
106
Sarkin & Daly, supra note 27, at 718; see also Todd Howland & William Calathes, The International
Criminal Tribunal, Is It Justice or Jingoism for Rwanda? A Call for Transformation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 135 (1998).
107
While there are elements of the inquisitorial model incorporated into the international criminal courts,
the defining structures, institutions, and guiding theories for the ad hoc tribunal are highly adversarial. See CASSESE,
supra note 97, at 376-87.
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widespread crimes. These “alternative” models have either sought to completely incorporate
restorative theories of justice, or balance them with retributive notions. As one former justice of
the ICTY notes, “[the modern trend] is the forceful emergence of individuals on the international
level, either as the authors of international crimes or of gross and large-scale breaches of human
rights, or as the victims of those crimes and breaches.”108 Through this process, an individual
history is developed and recorded; rather than a collective generalization of events that
international courts often create through retributive mechanisms of justice. Where accounts are
accurate and comprehensive, victims and witnesses feel that their victimization has been
acknowledged.

109

Through acknowledgement of their injuries, the victims are often more

capable of recovering from their injuries in order to lead more productive lives in society.110
In response to the ICTR and ICTY’s apparent failure to individualize victim
participation, separate institutions have been created in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia in
attempts to “bridge the gap” between individual perpetrators, victims, and witnesses and the
adjudicatory process. As will be seen, the success, or failure, of these supplemental models
hinges on how broad and expansive communal participation is.
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CASSESE, supra note 97, at 450.
See Sven Alkalaj, in THE SUNFLOWER 101, 103 (Henry J. Cargas & Bonny V. Fetterman eds., 1997);
Michael P. Scharf & Nigel Rodley, International Law Principles on Accountability, in POST CONFLICT JUSTICE 90
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
110
Many have argued that retributive mechanisms are dominated by judges and lawyers and neglect the
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individual experiences. See Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL
PERSP. 73, 103 (2002); Donald W. Shriver, Truth Commissions and Judicial Trials: Complementary or Antagonistic
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i. The Rwandan supplement: The use of Gacaca courts in Rwanda
In 2000, the Rwandan government approved legislation to complement the ICTR and
domestic criminal proceedings with state-run Gacaca courts.111

The courts were set up in

response to the severe strains faced by Rwanda’s judicial and prison systems in housing and
prosecuting thousands of accused perpetrators.112 Gacaca courts are community-based systems
of dispute resolution with pre-colonial roots.113 Over hundred of thousands of civilians are
utilized as judges and witnesses to process thousands of accused.114 While the majority of judges
and witnesses have no formal legal training, the Gacaca courts are based on traditional dispute
mechanisms familiar to most Rwandan communities.115 In Gacaca courts, offenders are required
to recount their wrongdoing in the presence of their victims and other affected parties.116 The
victim is also given the right to challenge the perpetrator’s story and in some circumstances can
receive monetary compensation.117 By bringing the two parties together, the offender is required
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to seek forgiveness.118 In turn, the offender can reduce their sentencing by half by pleading
guilty and confessing fully.119
The Gacaca process integrates different sectors of society by mediating disputes between
members of the community within their community.

Rather then segregate victims and

witnesses from the trial, the Gacaca process does exactly the opposite. In fact, it allows the
community, in its entirety, to participate in the trials. Gacaca courts also allow the victim to hear
the confession first-hand. Local NGOs work closely with the Gacaca courts to ensure that more
Rwandans participate and that the rights of citizens rights are protected.
However, as a result of their non-judicial nature and informal structure, Gacaca courts
have come under intense criticism for their lack of due process of law.120 Because Gacaca courts
are not purely restorative mechanisms, but allow for the courts to punish perpetrators, standards
of due process are needed to vitiate the defendant’s legitimately guaranteed rights. Nevertheless,
despite these criticisms, the Gacaca courts demonstrate the essential need to mix restorative and
retributive theories of justice. While the ICTR solely addressed retributive needs, albeit under
the theory that retribution leads to reconciliation, the Gacaca courts have to date filled in the void
needed for community development and peaceful integration.121
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ii. The failure of restorative mechanisms in the Yugoslav context
In over 13 years, the ICTY has prosecuted a relatively few number of people122 and has
generally been discredited amongst the concerned populations.123 Milosevic’s death has created
even greater disapproval by affected populations on the ICTY’s perceived failure to provide
post-conflict justice.

This failure is justified in part on the general perception that ICTY

proceedings take a considerable amount of time without providing much perspective on the
victims as opposed to the accused.124 Regardless of how impartial and accurate the ICTYs
findings are, its failure to establish credibility has affected its ability to develop consensus and
reconciliation amongst the concerned group and thus risks perpetuating the same stigmas,
divergences, and conflicts that created the initial aggressions to begin with. In order to combat
these perceived inadequacies, Serbia and Montenegro (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
established the Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission (YTRC)125 in 2001 to
compensate for the ICTY’s perceived bias and ineffectiveness. The YTRC was eventually
dissolved within two years without accomplishing much, if any, of its mandate.126
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The YTCR failed to meet its objectives for a number of reasons. First, the YTCR’s
limited mandate only concerned the causes of war127 and was inadequately funded.128 Instead of
determining who committed heinous crimes and who did not, the YTCR mandate required it to
draw a historical account of the causes of the Yugoslav civil wars. However, the purposes of
truth and reconciliation are not so much about historical causes of wars as they are an account of
the atrocities committing during the conflict.129 To that extent, the YTCR failed to provide one
of the basic objectives of restoration, which is recognition of the crimes committed.130
Moreover, the fundamental purpose of the YTCR was significantly weakened by its own
apparent bias.131 The YTCR was not designed to represent the various ethnic groups that were
affected by the Yugoslav conflict. Rather it was composed purely of Serbians, in Serbia, by the
Serbian president. Thus, its perceived subjectivity greatly inhibits its receptivity amongst the
affected populations.
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Second, the YTCR was established without public consultation or debate.132 The Gacaca
courts, by comparison, were only formulated after significant community and public
involvement. By not engaging NGOs and victims before and during the YTRC’s operation, the
Commission lacked credibility.133

It failed in the fundamental role of incorporating the

community into its developmental and reconciliatory process. Without the support of NGOs and
civil society, the YTRC was unable to reach out to victims and witnesses. The Gacaca courts
and the International Criminal Court (ICC) depend on NGOs to communicate between and
integrate victims and witnesses. Lastly, the YTRC was handicapped by a mandate that provided
no investigative powers and strict three-year time period.134 Without the support of civil society
and such operational limitation, the YTRC was rendered irrelevant to witnesses, victims and
perpetrators alike.
While the ICTY has received extensive criticism for failing to prosecute many of the
conflicts top leaders,135 equally important is the failure on part of legislatures in affected
communities to develop legitimate restorative mechanisms. The YTCR provides important
lessons as to the importance of participation, credibility, and state support in promoting
restorative mechanisms. The development of a TRC is insufficient by itself. Rather, the relevant
components for restorative justice are the incorporation of victims and witnesses, the
participation of civil society, and direct address of human rights abuses committed during the
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course of the conflict.136 Without these elements, any restorative mechanisms are meaningless in
effectuating reconciliation and rehabilitation.
b. Current trends to mix restorative and retributive models
In response to Rwandan and Yugoslavian experiences, the legal experts behind the Rome
Statute to the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone included
extensive measures to ensure the participation and protection of victims and witnesses. The
Rome Statute allows victims to participate in pre-trial procedural hearings137 and submit
observations to the Court’s jurisdiction or admissibility of the case.138 This effectively allows
victims to share their personal perspective and history with the ICC. The Prosecutor is required
to take into consideration the interests of the victims when determining whether to initiate an
investigation139 and in prosecuting crimes.140

Similarly, the Trial Court may allow

representatives of the victim to present their views where their interests are concerned.141 As
such, victims may question witnesses,142 make opening and closing statements,143 and obtain
financial assistance for legal representation.144

Lastly, the ICC has the power to order

reparations for the victims including restitution, compensation by the convicted person, and
rehabilitation,145 and allow victims to appeal reparation decisions by representation.146
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Recognizing the importance of restorative mechanisms, the Lome Peace Agreement
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,
required the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to work in conjunction
with the Special Court.147 While the Special Court is responsible for prosecuting persons most
responsible for heinous crimes committed during the civil war, the TRC is separately responsible
for creating “an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and
international humanitarian law . . . , to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims,
to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses
suffered.”148
The experiences of the ICTR, ICTY, ICC and Special Court for Sierra Leone indicate
modern trends to incorporate restoration and retribution either through the creation of separate
institution, or their merger into one criminal process. While there is no single methodology to
incorporate restoration and retribution, it is clear that both elements must be balanced for
transitional justice.

How the KRT effectively incorporates these models, therefore, is

fundamental to the question of justice in Cambodia.
III.

CONCERNS FOR THE CURRENT KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL MODEL
Recognizing the importance of witnesses and victims to the process of reconciliation,

both the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers (“EC Law”) and the
agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia have explicit provisions requiring the
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KRT “to provide for the protection of victims and witnesses.149 However, existing legislation
inside Cambodia makes it ambiguous, at best, as to the degree of victim and witnesses
participation and protection proffered by the KRT or the Cambodian government. While it is
reasonably likely that the KRT itself will read into its provisions a more substantiated roles for
victims and witnesses, a number of institutional problems currently facing the KRT make it less
reasonable that it will “produce anything but a few symbolic trials, if any.”150 Thus, the true
strength of the KRT will not be found in its prosecutorial power, for it is clear that the majority
of the Khmer Rouge leadership will not be tried, but rather in its role in creating an authoritative
history of the Khmer Rouge period.151
The critical nature of victim and witnesses participation in the KRT is greater enhanced
by a number of observations concerning the number of leaders tried, the lack of alternative
mechanisms, and public perception of the KRT’s role and functions.
a. Limited number of leaders to be tried
Article 1 of the EC Law allows the KRT only to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
most “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the
crimes and serious violations” committed during the Khmer Rouge period.152 Thus, mid to lowlevel officials cannot be tried under EC Law. However, most of the former Khmer Rouge senior
leaders have either died or have been granted amnesty from prosecution. Only two former
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Khmer Rouge officials, Kaing Khek Iev (a.k.a. Deuch)153 and Ta Mok,154 are currently in
custody. Other senior leaders like Ieng Sary,155 Khieu Samphan,156 and Nuon Chea157 live
comfortable lives in Cambodia’s capitol, Phnom Penh, and provincial towns.158 Many Khmer
Rouge leaders, including the movement’s supreme leader Pol Pot, and senior cadre, such as Son
Sen,159 Yun Yat,160 and Ke Pauk,161 have died since the 1975-1979 genocide. Unlike Chile’s
stripping of Pinochet’s immunity, there is no indication that the Hun Sen government in
Cambodia has any inclination to strip Ieng Sary or other leaders of their amnesty.
Therefore, the KRT’s number of potential defendants is extremely limited and the vast
majority of perpetrators will not face justice for their crimes. The prosecution of so few leaders
means that individual historical accounts are unlikely to be recorded into case history, thus
restricting the creation of a comprehensive historical account of the Cambodian genocide.
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In addition, key perpetrators will not be held responsible because of their legal immunity
from prosecution. This could be severely detrimental to the KRT’s public creditability. The
ICTY suffered a similar fate for its failure to capture and prosecute Radovan Karad]i^ and Ratko
Mladic and for failing to prosecute Milosevic before his death. The lack of high profile leaders
which could be suspect to prosecution increases the importance of victim and witnesses
involvement. If the KRT does not prosecute those leaders which have received immunity, the
greater narrative of the atrocities will be lost. To that extent, the KRT in its current form is
unlikely to satisfactorily promote retribution.162
b. The absence of alternative restorative mechanisms in Cambodia
A number of scholars have suggested that Cambodia shoud develop its own TRC in order
to provide victims a conduit for their past abuses.163 To date, however, no Cambodian TRC has
been proposed or developed to record individual complaints from victims.164 It is very unlikely
that Cambodia will construct its own TRC for a number of political and economic reasons. First,
the Cambodian government only agreed to the KRT after extensive political pressure was
exerted by the international community and NGOs. Given the less intuitive nature of restorative
mechanisms,165 it is even less unlikely that international or domestic forces will exert enough
political pressure necessary for the construction of an additional institution. In fact, previous
162
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efforts to develop a TRC similar to the South African version were rejected by the United States
and local advocacy groups in Cambodia.166
Second, a TRC implicates low to mid-level officials by allowing victims to dictate crimes
that were perpetrated against them.167 The majority of Cambodia’s political elite, including its
powerful prime minister, Hun Sen, were former low to mid level Khmer Rouge officials.168 In
fact, it is precisely because of their roles during the Khmer Rouge period that the Cambodian
government has extensively restricted the number of potential defendants169 that would be
subject to the KRT and have demanded the central role of the Cambodian judiciary.170
Third, even if the Cambodian government were to decide to establish a TRC that would
involve victims it would most likely be ineffective. When the South African TRC and various
others were established, they immediately followed the period of conflict.171 Victims, witnesses,
and offenders had vivid images of the atrocities and were more willing to engage with each
other. A Cambodian TRC, on the other hand, would be developed almost 30 years later. Many
of the low to mid level Khmer Rouge officials have since moved on and integrated themselves
deeply into society.

They have also aged or died away, much like many of the victims.

Therefore, the construction of a TRC could actually have negative repercussions to the stability
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of Cambodian life by re-creating the perpetrator/victim relationship within Cambodian
society.172
Lastly, the KRT has suffered from insufficient financial support and the government’s
reluctance to provide the necessary funds for its development.173 Given the abovementioned
political reasons, it is far less likely that either the international community or the Cambodian
government will allocate funds toward the creation of a Cambodian TRC or for the purposes of
community development.
c. Public support for the Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Because of structural and procedural inadequacies, most Cambodians are skeptical about
the KRT.

While the vast majority of Cambodians still desire that high-level officials be

prosecuted,174 Cambodians have emphasized the need for an impartial and objective tribunal,
some Cambodians would even prefer no trial be conducted if the trial had to be sub-standard.175
Such preferences could stem from concerns that government agents will manipulate the
proceedings to serve their own political needs.
Cambodians are conscious about the survival and empowerment of low-level Khmer
Rouge agents in society. The individuals who actually carried, planned, or directed the atrocities
during the Khmer Rouge period were mostly low-ranking officials in remote districts. While
many of low-level officials received direct orders from the central Khmer Rouge leadership,
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numerous murders were also committed purely without order. As such, there are significant
grievances by Cambodians that even low-level officials be prosecuted in some way.176
There is a common misconception by Cambodians that the KRT will prosecute all
persons responsible for crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge, including low-level agents.177
Most Cambodians see the top three people to be tried as being Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and
Ta Mok. Given that Ieng Sary and Samphan were granted immunity from prosecution, even if
Ta Mok and a few others are prosecuted and convicted, then the majority of Cambodians
probably still will not feel that justice has been delivered. Assuming the KRT does not adjust its
mandate and only prosecutes 5-7 individuals within the Khmer Rouge leadership, victims and
witnesses to the genocide will suffer the loss of law and justice.
d. Involvement of Victims and Witnesses
The participation of victims and witnesses is an indispensable aspect of transitional
justice.

As noted above, the experiences of the ICTR and ICTY have demonstrated that

prosecution without the direct involvement and participation of witnesses and victims severely
affects the credibility of the courts and by extension their effectiveness. The non-participation of
witnesses not only impact the credibility of trials, but also the effectiveness of the prosecution.178
A number of aspects affect the involvement of victims and witnesses: the existence of restorative
mechanisms, extensive participatory rights before the criminal court or tribunal, and protection
from physical and psychological harm.
i. Insufficient Participatory Rights for Victims under the EC Law
176
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While the EC Law has no provisions creating a separate “truth telling” institution, there
are a number of provisions which could provide victims the right to become parties in KRT
trials. Pursuant to Article 36, the EC Law allows the KRT to hear appeals filed by victims, as
well as the accused or the co-prosecutors.179

By incorporating provisions of Cambodia’s

domestic criminal code, the EC Law also leaves the possibility open for victims and witnesses to
participate in the KRT.

Under the EC Law, the co-prosecutors, trial chamber and co-

investigating judges must work in accordance with “existing procedures in force.”180
A number of provisions in Cambodia’s domestic criminal code provide for victim and
witness participation. First, under Cambodia’s Law on Criminal Procedure, a victim may either
propose that the prosecutor initiate an investigation or appeal to the Supreme Court, if the
prosecutor declines to prosecute, for prosecution.181 Victims may also join cases initiated by
other parties as long as a final judgment has not been reached.182 Second, Cambodian criminal
codes accord victims the same participatory rights as the defendants and prosecutor.
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victim’s attorney may file appeals following final judgment by the trial chamber183 or issuance of
pre-trial detention,184 call185 or examine witnesses,186 testify at trial,187 have access to the trial
transcript,188 request closing statements,189 or even propose interlocutory judgments.190
Whether or not provisions of Cambodia’s domestic code relating to victim participation
are read into the EC Law depends significantly on the flexibility of the respective judges and
prosecutors. It is just as likely that the judges and prosecutors will not utilize these provisions.
The aforementioned criminal codes relate to the victim’s ability to file companion civil claims to
criminal cases.191 Thus, unlike US cases, both the civil and criminal damages would be awarded
by the same court and be heard through the same judicial proceeding. The EC Law, however,
only provides for criminal sanctions192 and does not explicitly give rise to separate civil actions.
If the KRT adopts a narrow interpretation of its provisions under the EC Law, it could reject
broader participatory rights granted to victims under Cambodia’s criminal codes and only grant
the right of appeal as guaranteed under the EC Law.193 A broader interpretation, however,
comports more logically with EC Law’s provisions on victim participation. It is difficult to
understand how victims can appeal decision if they are not parties to a law suit. To do so, would
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be a serious violation of the defendant’s rights to due process. At least in theory, therefore,
victims have the right to participate in the KRT in the same way as they have the possibility to be
joined in as civil parties in a criminal case in Cambodia.
ii. Inadequate institutions for victim and witness protection
Integral to the success of tribunals in reconciling communities is the protection of victims
and witnesses from reprisals.194 Protection gives witnesses and victims a sense of security and
encourages their participation in trials. Thus, without personal security, witnesses and victims
are more likely to disassociate with criminal proceedings.195
The EC Law, on the other hand, fails to adequately ensure witness and victim protection.
Article 33 of the EC Law requires the court to provide measures, which protect the security and
confidentiality of victims and witnesses.196

However, the EC Law creates no independent

witness protection programs, like the Victim and Witness Protection Unit in the ICC, which
specifically help witnesses and victims. Rather, the Cambodian witness and victim protection
unit is staffed jointly by Cambodian officials, leaving security to Cambodian police.197 The
failure to create an independent security unit is likely to deter witnesses from testifying.
The Cambodian people, at large, continue to believe in the need for and power of justice
to provide some closure for this terrible period in Cambodian history.198 However, the majority
194
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of potential witnesses do not trust officials in the current government given that many officials,
including top leaders, were junior members of the Khmer Rouge.199 Witnesses fear potential
reprisals because the witness and victim protection units are composed purely of Cambodian
police officials with direct links to government authorities.200 Witness protection units similar to
the ICC and ICTY, on the other hand may ease some fears as they are composed of international
observers and workers.
Overall, common concerns and misunderstandings about the KRT are likely to fuel
continuing discontent and feelings of injustice if victims and witnesses are not actively engaged,
protected and integrated. Unless the KRT is adjusted to meet Cambodian perceptions of justice
and their concern for impunity, the tribunal will carry the stigma of politicizing the genocide
rather than accounting for it.
The EC Law contains provisions that would enable the trial court to integrate
international legal standards on the protection of victims and witnesses. The EC Law allows the
trial courts to seek guidance “in procedural rules established at the international level” where
there are no provisions on the topic or uncertainty.201 In the preparatory debates leading up to
the EC Law, Deputy Prime Minister, Sok An, noted that Article 33 was specifically designed to
give the trial chamber broad discretion in utilizing international standards and procedures when
providing for the protection of witnesses and victims.202
The United Nations Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power, establishes the most fundamental rights relating to victim protection and
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participation.203 In particular, the Declaration requires that victims be treated with compassion
and dignity,204 their views should be considered at appropriate stages of proceedings;205 victims
should be provided with proper assistance throughout the legal process;206 measures should be
taken to ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation;207 and procedures should be put in
place to ensure that victims have access to restitution,208 compensation,209 and medical,
psychological, and social assistance.210 These principles have been re-articulated in the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law211 and incorporated in the constitutive treaties for the ICC,212 European Court
on Human Rights,213 Inter-American Court on Human Rights,214 and African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights.215
In conformity with these principles, substantial measures are taken by the ICC to protect
them, including the creation of a Victim and Witness Unit.216 The Unit is responsible for
protecting the security and well being of victims and witnesses by providing for their protection,
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medical and psychological needs.217 Accordingly, the ICC can prohibit public disclosure of the
victim or witness’s name or location.218 The ICC can also ensure that all testimony is given in
closed sessions and that the victim or witness is given a pseudonym or that their voice or image
is altered.219 Most importantly, the ICC relies on local and international NGOs to protect the
confidentiality of witness’s identities and ensuring that the Court, itself, respects its own rules.220
Similarly, both ad hoc tribunals provided extensive protections for victims and witnesses.221 In
order to meet international standards and requirements, the KRT needs to take greater measures
to protect witnesses and victims and encourage their participation.
CONCLUSION
The record of accomplishment of the ICTR, ICTY, and ICC indicate that the participation
and protection of witnesses and victims serves a fundamental, if not necessary, component for
reconciliation. The current model for the KRT arguably fails to adequately assure the protection
and participation of victims and witnesses. However, the EC Law theoretically allows judges to
expand the scope of the KRT’s mandate by integrating international standards and provisions of
Cambodia’s law which could expand the role and protections for victims and witnesses. Without
an expanded focus on restorative justice, it is unlikely that individualized accounts of
victimization and offenses will be developed and along with it, the building blocks to
reconciliation.
Rather than repeating the mistakes of the past, it is important that the KRT consider the
following steps to satisfy the need for the tribunal’s reconciliatory role:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Utilize NGOs to ensure the full participation and protection of victims and witnesses in
trials, if they wish, pursuant to Cambodian law
Create additional legislative measures which guarantee the security of witnesses and
victims before, during, and after the trial
Create a separate witness and victim unit using international monitors and domestic
police agents in order to prevent acts of reprisal.
Develop a comprehensive history, which includes individual accounts of victimization.
Draft legislation making it explicitly clear that victims have the right to fully
participate in trials.

Failure to consider these or similar measures may prevent the KRT from emerging as an
independent judicial body that can bring justice and reconciliation to Cambodia. An ineffective
tribunal would only encourage the perpetrators of genocide in their belief in impunity and give
them cause to commit further crimes. The KRT’s success will depend on its ability to adapt to
the need and hopes of the Cambodian people. Without required changes promoting protection
and integration, the KRT will serve as nothing more than a $56 million dollar institution created
to appease the international conscious.
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